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The ramp: psychopathology of decision*
Antoni Kępiński
Besides crematorium chimneys and piles of 
naked, emaciated corpses, the selection scene 
on the railway ramp is one of the concentration 
camp images imprinted in human memory. A 
throng of women, men, elderly, children, rich 
and poor, handsome and ugly had marched in 
front of the SS physician standing in a posture 
of a ruler and judge. A small gesture of his hand 
had decided whether the other person, stand-
ing in front of him, will be sent immediately to 
a gas chamber, or will be given a chance to sur-
vive: at least days or months. There was some-
thing of the Last Judgement in this scene; a hand 
gesture directing to the fires or creating a possi-
bility of survival. Those waiting for the verdict 
were usually not aware of their future. Howev-
er, they knew, that a small gesture of a hand is 
meaningful and of great importance in their life, 
but the meaning was unclear until a head in gas-
mask appeared in a ceiling hole in a fake bath. 
Those prisoners who knew that selection means 
to be sent to gas, were using the remnants of 
their strengths to keep erect, walk energetically 
in aiming at a good impression on the SS physi-
cian, to be directed to his right.
One of the paradoxical features of the concen-
tration camp life was, one presumes, that in its 
overwhelming greyness, true Nacht und Nebel, 
it was exceptionally clear-cut. Events, subtle in 
normal life, revealing itself in discrete colours 
and shades, and because of this sometimes even 
unnoticed, here appeared as dramatic, in unu-
sual proportions, evoking the observer’s horror 
and wonder for human nature. That is why an 
analysis of concentration camp life offers a pos-
sibility to understand many phenomena of hu-
man life, which in normal circumstances pass 
unnoticed due to their subtleness and ambigui-
ty. Some analogy can be found between this sit-
uation and psychiatry. The latter studies human 
life phenomena in enlarged proportions, and 
thus making them available for observation. Ex-
ceptional expressiveness of the camp experience 
can also explain its deep engraving into memo-
ry. Many concentration camp survivors still have 
camp night dreams, and some of the camp life 
images govern their imagination.
A friendly gesture, word or smile, customary 
in everyday life, could save there somebody’s 
life, restore a person’s courage. Feeling of res-
ignation, longing for an end of everyday hard-
ships, thoughts of passing away without a trace, 
as rainy days pass, in concentration camp often 
ended with death. Who did not want to live any 
longer, often did not wake up the next morn-
ing. Friendships founded in the camp were so 
strong, that they lasted against time, often taking 
the place of other previous or later relationships. 
For the survivors, friends from the camp stay for 
ever the closest, and the only ones able to under-
stand them. Good and bad features of human 
nature, which in normal life compose complicat-
ed character of every human being, in concen-
tration camp extended to the dimension of hero-
ism, holiness and martyrdom, or monstrous bru-
tality, egoism, cruelty and degenerated cynicism. 
One can quote many examples. The life on the 
death edge, situation in which one false step, an 
incorrect decision or simple accident could lead 
to the prisoner’s annihilation or towards bru-
tal violence in which one was losing humanity, 
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were probably the reason of such a sharp outlin-
ing of human features and rules. 
The same sharp outlines concerned the prob-
lem of decision. The ramp situation covered 
three variants of decision making: that who 
decided the fates of other human beings, that 
who knew what is ahead of them and decided 
to overcome it, and others who did not know 
what had been prepared form them, and in their 
doubts, anxiety and uncertainty were making ac-
cidental, often senseless  decisions. 
These three variants are present also in eve-
ryday life.
The easiest to imagine are experiences of those 
who proclaimed verdicts. Maybe they felt some-
times like playing a role of the Almighty on the 
Last Judgement, or they were feeling tiredness 
and boredom. Did they believe to be fulfilling 
their duties of cleaning the race, or were they 
in hurry to be somewhere else, thinking about 
having a rest after their heavy duty, wanting to 
wash any trace of pang of conscience in alcohol. 
A hand gesture deciding on the other human be-
ings’ life, may be, rather a result of an accident 
then thinking through, that for example: every 
tenth or twentieth could be offered life.
In human life it is difficult to avoid situations 
which involve decisions about other people’s 
fates, as well as those, in which somebody else 
decides on our fate. A scope of power and posi-
tion in social hierarchy usually corresponds with 
the importance of decision. The decision is more 
evident with a size of the group it refers to, and 
an impact it has on their lives. Nevertheless, eve-
ry decision concerning other human beings has a 
heavy load of responsibility. One can even ques-
tion the right to take such responsibility at all.
Those who had decided on life or death of 
thousands of people on the ramp, did not feel 
responsible for their fate, or, what is also possi-
ble, felt responsible in a negative sense, feeling 
responsibility for efficient annihilation of peo-
ple who were perceived as disgrace to humani-
ty. It should be assumed, that they suffered from 
a pathological lack of imagination. Otherwise, a 
gesture of the hand would not be so easy. They 
acted as automatons: the more and the faster, 
the better. 
It happens to everybody to decide on oth-
er person’s fate. These are not easy decisions. 
Therefore norms of various kinds, prescribing a 
decision to conditions, are helpful in such situa-
tions. For a judge, such norms would be consti-
tuted by law, for the physician - his knowledge 
on diagnostics and prognosis, and for a teach-
er - examination requirements range. The more 
objective decision is going to be, the more im-
portant is the role of the norms, which intend to 
eliminate subjective factors, especially emotion-
al. When relying on norms, decision becomes 
normative. That means the decision is no long-
er one’s own, but would be everybody’s in the 
same situation; relying on the same norms, eve-
rybody would make the same decision. In this 
sense, justice is blind. Ideally a just person does 
not see the other person with his own eyes, but 
from a standpoint of the norms he is represent-
ing. In this way of thinking, one could conclude, 
that “ideally just” SS physician would be that 
one, who blindly followed the norms imposed 
by his superiors: and send the strongest to the 
camp, and all the rest to gas chambers. His deci-
sion would not involve any subjective elements, 
especially emotional - automaton in action. But 
the absurd of such a conclusion could be in the 
fact, that the human being is normally incapable 
of making absolutely just decisions and to bind 
his eyes as the mythological Themis. Those de-
ciding on the other person’s fate are not only un-
able to follow the norms strictly, but have to see 
him, to empathise, to imagine his past, present 
and future situation, etc. All these mental func-
tions connected with the decision making proc-
ess require an emotional involvement. Every 
teacher, physician and judge – professionals de-
ciding on other people fate – are aware of this. 
And, they are not replaceable by even the most 
efficient computer. 
In contrast, the example of the SS physician, 
performing a selection process on the ramp, con-
fronts us with the importance of the emotional 
factor in decision making; especially decisions 
which concern other people. Other people con-
stitute the most significant environment for a 
human being and therefore decisions concern-
ing them are the most important and emotional-
ly involving in the highest degree. A basic emo-
tional decision in regard to another human being 
is this: approach or escape. These two directions 
contain a variety of emotional shadows. But, the 
directions itself can be described as an attitude 
of sympathy, antipathy and indifference. For the 
 The ramp: psychopathology of decision 73
Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 2008; 3 : 71–80
SS physician, the Jews he selected were repulsive 
(antipathy), or at least completely indifferent. He 
was brought up in such an attitude or such ideas 
were implanted to him. He did not perceive pris-
oners as human beings, he was not interested in 
them, except as objects for pseudoscientific ex-
periments, or robbery: for sure he did not think 
about approaching them, to chat, or ask about 
their feelings.  Emotional distance is essential for 
war propaganda; citizens’ contacts with the ene-
my are restricted to a minimum; the enemy’s im-
age is presented in the worst possible colours.
When people in close emotional relations start 
to feel distant, lose interest and do not under-
stand each other any more – this usually is the 
disruption of the emotional union.
Physicians-prisoners had to decide many times 
on their patients’ life or death, too. Certainly 
those decisions had to be difficult, but they could 
not avoid them; there was life saving medication 
only for a few; not everybody could be saved 
from selection, etc. They had to choose: who is 
to be sentenced for death, which person can be 
offered a chance to survive. An absurd analo-
gy can be drawn - that they decided in a simi-
lar way as the SS physicians did. The absurd in 
this conclusion is based on not paying attention 
to the difference in emotional attitudes. Physi-
cians-prisoners wanted to help their patients at 
any stake, even those who could not be helped 
and those, whom they had to sentence for death 
against their will. For the SS physicians, the pa-
tients were an alien and indifferent element, to 
be eliminated sooner or later. 
Throughout this century1 the transformation of 
the natural environment of human beings into a 
technological one, presents a technological view 
of the other person; that means human features 
are becoming less important, replaced by fea-
tures enforcing effective functioning of techno-
social machinery. This is, probably, one of the 
most dangerous aspects of contemporary civili-
zation. Behaviour of the physician on the ramp, 
being the extreme realisation of this approach, 
should be a warning.
Relatively few prisoners, who understood the 
meaning of the SS physician’s hand gesture, rep-
resent another variant. Some were in prostration 
and accepted their fate indifferently, unable to 
make any decision, take any action to adopt a 
1 The 20th century
posture of a strong and healthy man, being at 
the end of their strength, in a “Muslim” state. 
There were, however, prisoners who decided to 
survive at all cost, overcoming exhaustion, ill-
ness, weakness and apathy. They were able to 
mobilize their strength with an extreme effort, 
bring their emaciated body to an upright posi-
tion and walk with springs in their feet in front 
of SS physician. Even children marching in front 
of the SS-men walked on tiptoes tried to touch 
with their heads a bar, whose level delineated 
life and death. That exceptional effort was not 
always effective, as often the pure accident and 
“the judge” fantasy decided whether a prison-
er was sent to the gas-chamber or was allowed 
to live some time more. Prisoners had accept-
ed an exam conditions anyway; they were do-
ing their best to be as their oppressors wanted 
to see them; the numbers still suitable for work. 
The concentration camp regime demanded 
strengths and working until complete exhaus-
tion and death would come. The number had to 
function effectively and till the end; a German 
sense of order and economy did not allow for 
life of the numbers unsuitable to work on the 
Third Reich’s benefit. 
Acceptance of the model of behaviour de-
signed for prisoners by concentration camps cre-
ators was the first requirement for the camp life. 
An “admission ceremony”, intended to erase 
habits of the earlier life-style and enforce the 
camp model, was not invented by the camp life 
organisers. It exists, of course not in such dra-
matic form - in various social institutions; espe-
cially is those which require quick adaptation of 
the new member to obligatory norms. Old pat-
terns of behaviour, especially those which are 
inconsistent with the new ones have to be elimi-
nated; and, at the same time new, obligatory pat-
terns have to be enforced. One of the examples 
is that for conscripts in the army. Usually new-
comers have such a difficult time not only in an 
army, but also in a new workplace, new school 
or kindergarten, etc. Entering a new social group 
has always its price. The more rigorous are the 
group behaviour forms, the more difficult the 
trial time. With time, the new behavioural forms 
become automatised, and performed without a 
decision making process concerning if and how 
they should be done. But achieving this stage re-
quires learning. The enrolled soldier learns to sa-
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lute; at first clumsy, later he performs the salut-
ing automatically, without hesitance and at min-
imal will effort.
Taking on the new forms does not always 
mean their inner acceptance. A soldier can ele-
gantly salute his superiors, which does not mean 
he respects them. Taking on some forms without 
inner acceptance is called conformism. In spite 
that something is performed against conviction, 
that the decision is not one’s own, but someone 
else’s, imposed from the outside, the act is, with 
time, performed as effectively as that which fol-
lows ones’ own choice. Rebellion against the im-
posed form cannot be too strong and has to be 
weaker with time; otherwise it would paralyse 
all learning processes and performance of the 
new forms of behaviour. In hypnosis, a span 
of the other’s will is wider than the one’s own. 
Hypnotic suggestion can lead to a performance 
which is impossible even at one’s own strongest 
will effort, e.g. increasing muscle tension to ri-
gidity, influencing the vegetative system to slow 
down or accelerate the hearth rate, constricting 
the arteries etc., influencing perception (e.g. of 
pain, hearing, seeing), activating memory (e.g. 
from early childhood), etc. Nevertheless a hyp-
notist is not able to impose upon the hypnotised 
person anything contrary to the latter’s will, e.g. 
to kill somebody or himself. 
The majority of concentration camp prisoners 
did not accept the norms of life being enforced 
on them, with an exception of those who want-
ed to imitate the camp rulers; they incorporated 
their persecutors’ structure of thinking and as in 
the case of proselytes, were more eager in fol-
lowing the norms. At the beginning of incarcer-
ation, when the prisoners were completely lost; 
the “admission ceremony” mentioned above 
was helpful. Being overwhelmed made it easier 
to behave automatically, follow the regime rules 
and put aside what they were used to in their 
lives. With time, they were becoming indifferent 
to events which earlier evoked terror and repul-
sion; they were also less sensitive to their pains 
and suffering. Many of the camp activities were 
becoming automatic; they automatically adopted 
an upright position with their hats off seeing SS-
men, automatically took their places at roll calls, 
marched to work, etc. Automation was the ne-
cessity. One could not hesitate if an act should or 
should not be performed; it had to be done im-
mediately and in the most effective way; other-
wise one could be severely beaten or killed.
The ramp situation was an exam for the prison-
er: is he still capable to perform functions of the 
camp prisoner, or is he ready for the gas-chamber 
or the death injection only. That is why, with the 
maximum effort he tried to pass the exam. Eve-
ry institution has its exam situation, checking ca-
pabilities of their members. Those unable to per-
form their duties properly are excluded. In the 
camp, exclusion was synonymous with death.
Death, being an everyday reality in concentra-
tion camps, enforced immediate decisions; there 
was no time for careful thinking which way to 
choose or consider, which choice would be bet-
ter, which worse. Action had to be instant; a mo-
ment of hesitation would end in death. There 
was no place for error; a false decision could end 
in death. A soldier in the battlefield is in a simi-
lar situation; there is not enough time for think-
ing and hesitations; the majority of actions are 
performed automatically; without consciousness 
being fully involved. 
Risk of death, changes the time perspective of 
human life. In normal conditions, the future ex-
tends to an undetermined end of life. Even the 
elderly or those seriously ill do not fully recog-
nize the close limits of their life; they believe to 
still have a free space of the future before them. 
The free space allows to choose between activi-
ties, errors can be corrected; there is time for hes-
itation and for conscious decisions. 
The time perspective changes at high risk sit-
uations. As the future shortens, it becomes ex-
tremely intense and important. Closeness of 
death makes the decisions more important; er-
roneous ones can bring death, correct ones - vic-
tory. All decisions which are not directly con-
nected with survival become worthless. Forms 
of behaviour become reduced to basic ones, only 
those connected to the quest for life. All that 
used to be till now the content of life and was 
determining the acts of will is excluded, as that 
which is unimportant. In such situations nobody 
thinks about questions tormenting him in every-
day life. Everyday problems and decisions ap-
pear to be ridiculous in situations when life is 
at risk. At the same time decisions have to be 
quick, there is no time for careful consideration 
of all “for” and “against”, this way or that. Of-
ten decisions are made impulsively. Sometimes 
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reflection comes only after the life risk situation 
is over; why this action rather then that one was 
taken. In normal conditions one would not be 
able to decide so quickly on taking appropriate 
action (bad choice cannot be remembered – bad 
choice ended with death).
The way of behaving in life, at situations of 
risk, is usually not an act of the free, conscious 
will, but rather a kind of reflex, an automatic re-
sponse. We feel responsible for it, and the com-
munity usually assesses it similarly; moreover, 
often such situations are regarded as a test for 
the value of the person’s character. 
Is this attitude accurate? An inner conviction 
prompts, that terminal situations are the ulti-
mate probe for the person’s merits, nevertheless 
rational thinking opposes such an approach. 
How could it be, that the most important deci-
sion, focusing on human merits would be that, 
which does not allow time for careful assessment 
of arguments pro and contra, but be made in a 
sudden illumination on its “appropriateness”, 
or completely automatically? What empowers 
us to assess decisions made in the terminal situ-
ation, deprived of the fundamental attribute of 
conscious decision – thinking, through alterna-
tive activities and carefully choosing the prop-
er way of action?
Contradiction between an inner conviction 
and rational thinking results from a presump-
tion, that a decision is equal to an act of will, the 
will being the highest phenomenon of mental 
life, steering human behaviour. The background 
of this presumption is, it seems, the Cartesian 
model of man, extremely dualistic, in which the 
body is a mechanism directed by the mind. An 
act of will is an order sent to this mechanism. As 
such it has to be a kind of quintessence of men-
tal life; it cannot be something as impulse, a re-
flex, something not thought through. 
Approach toward the nature, human being in-
cluded, is being formed to the great extent, by 
technological models. What man had created is 
easier to understand. A mechanical approach in 
biology perceives living creatures as complicat-
ed mechanisms. This approach allowed medi-
cine to study the human organism. Mechanisms 
can be manipulated freely; it can be dismantled, 
which makes scientific cognition possible. Mech-
anistic conceptions opened the way for scientif-
ic medicine. Nevertheless a mechanism is una-
ble to act from within, it has to be empowered 
from outside, and has to be steered. This was 
the beginning of problems. Human beings have 
the souls, and only people have free will; ani-
mals have neither soul nor free will, so they be-
have as automatons, reacting in a specific way to 
specific stimuli. Mentally ill people had no free 
will, as their soul was ill. Followers of the dualis-
tic approach were also in trouble to explain how 
the mental is connected with the somatic, and to 
find a point where mental and somatic come to-
gether. Descartes, as we know thought that the 
pineal gland is a switch between the mental and 
physical. By rejecting the existence of the soul, 
one had to reject the problem of free will. Deter-
minism was a consequence. Biological rules re-
ferred to the human being too; man was fully ex-
plained by them, having no freedom of choice. 
By the end of the last century (19th) an optimis-
tic concept was accepted, that even such a com-
plicated mechanism as the human being can be 
fully understood by  rules of physics and chem-
istry, with the movement of elementary parti-
cles. This was an extremely important notion for 
the development of medicine and biochemistry; 
there is still a conviction in therapy, that every-
thing can be solved in the chemical way. 
Since World War II, a new technological mod-
el based on self-steering mechanisms has been 
developed. The term used reflects, that the prob-
lem of decision making (act of will in psycholog-
ical terminology), which had been a trouble for 
the mechanistically oriented biologists, was ap-
proached with a technological solution. A system 
steering an air defence gun barrel decides itself 
how the barrel should be positioned and when 
the ammunition is to be sent. Everybody who 
used a gun knows that pulling a trigger is con-
nected with some hesitation and tension, neces-
sary to choose the best moment and aim prop-
erly. Experienced riflemen decide on the proper 
moment quicker; sometimes the best shot is giv-
en automatically. A complicated process of deci-
sion making, which many students perceive as 
the most important mental activity, can be per-
formed better by a machine, than by a human 
being. It does not mean that machines have the 
souls, nor that mental life can be replaced by a 
machine. Nevertheless, machines are capable 
of performing some activities understood until 
only recently as attributes of the human psyche: 
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logical thinking and decision making, and that 
fact requires a revision of the concept of the psy-
che. For example the psyche cannot be identified 
with a particular function any longer , e.g. the 
act of will. We do not have a satisfying definition 
of life, or definition of subjective aspects of life, 
which is described as soul or psyche.
The ability of decision making in self-steering 
machines is regulated by three components: pro-
gramming of the task, input of information from 
the outside, especially these concerning effects 
of action (feed-back), and memory. These three 
elements form a decision, which can be given in 
the form of an elementary answer(“yes” or “no”) 
as in calculators, or in a continuous form (modu-
lated answer) as in the analogue machines. 
Cybernetic models helped to understand the 
brain activity. On the other hand, cybernetics 
profited from the results of neuroscience (the 
brain cortex network by Lorente de Nó was 
used in designing various self-steering equip-
ments). The neurone’s morphological structure 
indicates that a decision is made within it. Many 
dendrites collect information from the surround-
ings (in addition to information from within a 
cell body via the axo-somatic synapses), but in-
formation from the neurone goes via one axon 
only. It is within the neurone’s body, that the in-
coming signals are integrated and the decision 
made - what information is to be sent out.
A structure of an inter-neurone connection al-
lows for some sent signals to come back (closed 
circuits). This enables feedback. A neurone is in-
formed on the results of its action. Incoming sig-
nals are recorded. Hyden hypothesised [2], that 
a mechanism of memory is the change in the 
DNA and RNA structure resulting from in-com-
ing information in neurones. This is an attrac-
tive hypothesis combining phylogenetic memo-
ry (heredity) with onto genetic memory within 
the same biochemical mechanism. The task pro-
grammed in a neurone - if Hyden’s hypothesis 
will be proven - is the DNA (a genetic substance) 
modified by neural cell activity. 
So, neurone fulfils conditions necessary for de-
cision making in self-steering systems. And, as 
in these systems decisions can be of a “yes -no” 
type, or quantitative type. In the first one, there 
is a full discharge of the neurone (functional, 
or spike potential), of maximal size, and inde-
pendent from the size of impulse, or there is no 
discharge. As in computers, the 0-1 language is 
used (1- discharge; 0- no discharge). In the sec-
ond one there is a local change of electric poten-
tial (local potential or generative potential), pro-
portional to the size of the impulse.
Millions of neurones with various kinds of 
connections form a network. There is a hierarchy 
in this net: a single neurone decision depends 
on that of other neurones. Some groups of neu-
rones form a kind of working groups on specif-
ic problems (neural centres). Decision in-coming 
to such a group, is of global character: perform 
or stop a particular activity; performance details 
are not worked on. 
Hierarchy in the decision process is connect-
ed with selection. Not all information can get 
higher. Part of it has to be rejected. The criteri-
on for selection is importance of information for 
the organism. The selection is so evident, that it 
can be seen in the anatomical study. For exam-
ple: the human retina is build of 6 millions cones 
and 110 millions rods, but the optic nerve - only 
1 million fibres. As Walsh wrote [3]: “the retina 
tends to capture elements of possible biological 
meaning and to reject the rest”. Out-coming in-
formation is organised in an opposite way; deci-
sion “from up” is copied in the case of a less im-
portant effector, or individual; - if more impor-
tant. A classical example can be the movement 
field in the cortex. Hand, mouth or tongue repre-
sentations are much bigger than those for body 
or legs muscles. That is why the homunculus 
representing cortex representation looks so ri-
diculous. Its deformation results from inequali-
ty among the human body executive units; mus-
cles of the back are plebeian in comparison with 
the muscles of the hand or tongue. This distor-
tion in anatomical proportions is much smaller 
in animals; importance of particular effectors is 
distributed more evenly. In the evolution proc-
ess, the main manner of man’s action became the 
grasping activity of the hands and speech activ-
ity; so, the role of these movement elements is 
bigger in comparison with the rest of the move-
ment apparatus. In animals, a balance between 
effectors has been preserved. The importance 
scale refers to signals in-coming to the nervous 
system too. Selection is performed according to 
this scale. In consequence an image of the sur-
rounding world is distorted; we see what is im-
portant for us. 
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The central symptom of the neurasthenic syn-
drome, both organic and psychogenic, is a dis-
order of the hierarchy in the central nervous sys-
tem’s work, selection including. Signals of less 
importance, usually repressed, activate the cen-
tral nervous system to the same degree as the 
important ones; it creates a chaos (cybernetic 
“noise”), resembling a bad cybernetic system, 
in which the central organ knows everything 
and decides on everything. In consequence it 
does not know anything and decides on noth-
ing. In hysteric conversion the situation is op-
posite; some functional systems become exclud-
ed from a general hierarchy of the central nerv-
ous system and become autonomic; this results, 
on a clinical level, with paralysis or hyperactiv-
ity. In social systems analogical autonomisation 
appears when authorities, in congruence with 
the individuals’ benefits, artificially intervene in 
their life. In such a situation, opposing organisa-
tions are being created to enable a discharge of 
tendencies repressed by the authority.
The third - besides hierarchy and selection 
- characteristic of the central nervous system 
work, essential in decision making, is collectiv-
ity. A single neurone makes decisions, but its 
role is meaningless, if it is not supported by de-
cisions of other neurones. And vice versa, the 
decision of a single neurone depends on other 
neurones’ decision; responding to a signal com-
ing from other neurones it can respond “yes” 
or “no” (functional potential), or limit its re-
sponse to a local reaction. Local reactions, acti-
vating the part of a neurone, prepare it to a fi-
nal answer “yes” or “no”. In spite of mutual in-
teractions and a collective character of the neu-
rones’ work, they keep their individuality; their 
own rhythm of work - making decisions: alter-
native “yes” or “no”, or quantitative (local reac-
tion). These elementary (single neurone) deci-
sions build the group decisions. Groups of neu-
rones are connected by common tasks and, con-
sequently, common decisions too. Hierarchy and 
specialisation develops. Groups are subdued to 
others in an chain of dependencies. One signal 
only is sufficient to activate a sequence of events, 
sometimes quite a complicated one. 
 The problem of epilepsy seems to be in dis-
ruption in the structure of mutual dependency 
and collective character of the neurones work. 
A group of neurones starts to discharge in their 
own rhythm, not obliged - one could say - by the 
work of other neurones. That rhythm is trans-
mitted to the other neural cells step by step, re-
sulting in the general epileptic discharge. Com-
paring the central nervous system work to that 
of a symphonic orchestra, in which each musi-
cian plays in his specific way, but all of them to-
gether play a melody, an epileptic seizure could 
be a situation created by one of them suddenly 
stroking a drum, independently from the gen-
eral melody. The drum influences other musi-
cians, and all start to perform the same rhythm. 
Approaching neurones discharge as its alterna-
tive a (yes or no) decision and an epileptic sei-
zure could be perceived as an example of ex-
treme freedom of decision, leading to extreme 
de individuation and slavery. An epileptic sei-
zure is an antithesis of collective character of the 
central nervous system’s work, which is based 
on close interdependence of the neurones’ de-
cision; a break in this interdependence creates 
a totalitarian unification of decisions. Variety of 
individual rhythms is replaced by the only, com-
mon rhythm. 
 A collectivity of the decision decreases with 
a repetition of the task. New tasks activate the 
whole nervous system, and in sequence - the 
whole organism. Subjectively, this is experienced 
as concentration on a particular activity, deliber-
ation on the way of performance, inner tension 
connected with the decision process; often ac-
companied by vegetative symptoms. The state-
ment on the whole organism involvement in de-
cision making is not an exaggeration. Neverthe-
less, with task repetition, the decision is grad-
ually more and more easy, so the choice of an 
adequate functional structure becomes automat-
ic. A particular activity is performed by the most 
suitable part, not the whole nervous system. Re-
alisation follows the effort of the economy prin-
ciple, as it happens in phylogenetic and ontogen-
ic development. 
The organism’s cells specialise in particular 
activities, and in this way, they free the other 
cells from being involved in activities the first 
ones are specialised in. One should not forget, 
that the whole signal system, receptivity, nerv-
ous and effectual, has developed as a group of 
cells specialised in three basic functions: receiv-
ing signals, transmission of signals, and react-
ing to signals. 
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The specialisation process does not end with 
phylogeny but is continued in individual devel-
opment. A child learning to walk, speak, write 
etc., activates its whole receptivity system to 
these activities. Watching child behaviour, one 
can see the effort it engages to choose the prop-
er form of movement and its consequent per-
formance. The whole will effort is concentrated 
on the activity. With time, the activity becomes 
automotive, performed without any hesitance, 
one’s own command is enough: walking, speak-
ing and writing etc., to activate the complicat-
ed chain of events leading to the activity per-
formance. The problem of choice and decision, 
characteristic for the nervous system work, does 
not disappear with automation, but is limited to 
a particular, specialised part of the system; the 
rest being not involved. In a difficult situation, 
an activity, once automatic, becomes conscious 
again (e.g. hiking in tough conditions requires 
a conscious decision of each step); the decision 
becomes again a general, not regional one, as it 
happens with automatic activities.
An automation problem is closely related to 
the problem of decision hierarchy. Quanta of 
decision, which means decisions of particu-
lar neurones, are connected in smaller and big-
ger groups. Particular groups are specialised in 
particular problems. E.g. selection of signals in-
coming to the nervous system, steering particu-
lar vegetative or movement activity, co-coordi-
nating of decisions etc. Position in decision hi-
erarchy is higher with the number of groups in-
volved. Life brings new tasks, so decisions of the 
highest hierarchy position have to be formed 
permanently. With a repetition of the task, the 
decision goes down in hierarchy, with the func-
tion economy principle; groups necessary for di-
recting the particular task are activated. This is 
how automation is done.
Three factors influence the decision style: 
theme (programme), tempo of choosing and 
changeability. Theme, of course depends on the 
genetic programme encoded in the nucleus of 
the neurone, nevertheless the history of it de-
pends on the neurone’s history. Stimuli of the 
same kind, with time, will develop typical deci-
sions. The neurone will specialise in a given kind 
of problems, and will solve them in a specific 
way. The theme could be e.g. selection of impuls-
es coming from retina receptors; selection will, 
in a typical way, depending on impulses coming 
from neurones situated higher in the hierarchy. 
That is why human perception of the surround-
ing world depends on the person’s mood, emo-
tional tone, attitude towards environment, in-
volvement, kind of occupation, etc.
Theme is related to a speed of decision mak-
ing. The narrower the theme, the quicker deci-
sion. Narrowly specialised neurones are much 
quicker in the “yes” or “no” response in compar-
ison with those less specialised, collecting var-
ious signals from various parts of neural sys-
tem (e.g. cortex neurones). It can be supposed, 
that in the non-specialised neurones, quantita-
tive responses dominate over alternative ones. 
The tempo of decision making depends on a 
length of the reflex arch. Decisions involving 
a number of neurones require more time than 
one made within a smaller loop. With automa-
tion, decisions are made quicker. Changeabili-
ty of the decision depends on the level of perse-
verance, which means repetition of a kind of re-
action type independently of the in-coming in-
formation. The higher the level of perseverance, 
the more stable the decision. In the brain, espe-
cially in the cortex, closed loops of neurones can 
often be met, in which a signal out-going from 
neurone A, passing a series of neurones: B, C, D, 
etc., comes back to neurone A, and can circulate, 
theoretically endlessly in the loop. Such systems 
increase the stability of decision. 
An attempt of understanding the problem of 
the decision within a scope of contemporary 
neurophysiology is a kind of provisional hy-
pothesis, which has to be changed with an in-
creasing body of knowledge of the neural sys-
tem physiology. Progress in neurophysiology is 
connected with progress in technology; the lat-
ter one results in new research methods, and al-
lows for the development of the new theoretical 
models, bringing us closer to understanding the 
activities of the brain (e.g. the computer model 
allows for a better understanding of the living 
brain actions than the telephone switchboard). 
Perception and the action connection principle 
(the reflex arch principle) is valid here, as in oth-
er domains of life; we perceive the world parallel 
to the way we influence the world; that means - 
we live in the world we create.
It would be a serious misunderstanding to 
make the decision in a neuropsychological sense 
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equal to the psychological one. Presumably, the 
problem of decision has engaged people since 
self-reflection appeared. This is one of the main 
questions in philosophical thought, in psychol-
ogy and psychiatry. Psychologists and psychia-
trists try to understand reasons of a particular 
decision in every case studied; the problem of 
behaviour motivation is closely connected. Be-
sides, everybody is asking themselves the same 
question and tries to answer it in a most possibly 
rational way. Rationality is not equal with right-
ness of understanding of ones’ own or other’s de-
cision. An example could be someone, who when 
influenced by a hypnotic or subliminal sugges-
tion, that means one not registered in the con-
sciousness (a method used sometimes in visual 
advertising in the West) performs the suggested 
decision, but being unaware of the suggestion, 
finds a rational explanation for his action. 
It seems that there are analogies between the 
decision in a neuropsychological sense and the 
decision in a psychological sense. Some of them 
deserve attention, as they can make understand-
ing of the complicated act of will easier.
Alternative and quantitative decisions, the two 
kinds of decisions used by the nervous system, 
can be compared in mental life, to a choice be-
tween alternative possibilities and continuous 
hesitation; the latter however, not being a deci-
sion, creates a climate for the decision.
 The collective character of the nervous sys-
tem’s work responds to an integration principle 
in mental life; conflicting emotions, thoughts 
and tendencies, create a more or less harmoni-
ous wholeness altogether, one typical for each 
person and the founding of his/her identity. Con-
scious decision is a result of this integrity, so it 
sometimes requires a reasonable amount of ef-
fort, as creation of a wholeness from opposition-
al tendencies is not an easy task.
The substance of decision is selection. What 
has been rejected does not disappear without 
trace. Notion of this, one could say obvious fact, 
we owe to Freud. Analysing neurotic symptoms, 
dreams and slips of tongue, he proved with no 
doubts, the existence of the repressed. In an ob-
sessive compulsive neurosis, the ability to decide 
is evidently weakened by obsessions, compul-
sions and phobias. A fight with this strange and 
rejected by consciousness mental element leads 
nowhere; it only increases the obsessive-compul-
sive experience. What had been rejected in selec-
tion, now takes revenge over what had won se-
lection. Normally, only a small part of the selec-
tion process goes on in the consciousness. We 
are permanently making choices and decisions, 
however majority of this process goes on beyond 
our consciousness; only later, we are sometimes 
surprised with some of our decisions.
In schizophrenia a mechanism of struggle be-
tween two contradictory possibilities, normally 
hidden, becomes open. Such a pathological un-
veiling of the selection process, concerns main-
ly the choice between basic emotional attitudes. 
This choice is normally made beyond conscious-
ness; one cannot force himself to love, hate nor 
fear. Steering emotions is also impossible in 
schizophrenia, nevertheless the struggle between 
contradictory emotional attitudes - so strong that 
none can win - becomes often dramatically open. 
An impossibility of choosing the basic emotion-
al attitude, influences the whole patient’s mental 
life and behaviour. The basic emotional attitude 
forms the cornerstone for more detailed activity 
forms. The patient extends his hand in a gesture 
of welcome, and takes it back immediately; takes 
a seat, and gets up; his facial expression reflects 
contradictory emotions, usually with no corre-
spondence to the ongoing situation. 
Collectivity of decision reveals itself in social 
life too. One person’s decisions influence the de-
cisions of the other. In concentration camp life 
this phenomenon had an exceptionally strong 
impact. In a state of extreme exhaustion or dur-
ing the initial period of imprisonment, the pris-
oner was loosing his ability of choosing, he was 
following what his close inmates did; walked 
there, where he was push to go. Getting out 
from this state of automatism was indispensable 
for survival. The ability to decide is the funda-
mental attribute of life. The inmate’s help, some-
one’s supportive words etc. were bringing back 
the ability to choose. The helper facilitated the 
decision making; “I want” was formed from a 
collective “we want”. 
The problem of automation, essential for the 
nervous system economy of work, indicates the 
recognised fact, that nothing disappears in na-
ture, that every decision is encrypted in neu-
rones and influences the next ones. This way the 
next decisions are easier; they do not engage the 
whole nervous system, but its part only, which 
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is necessary for the task performance. We talk 
about automation, in a psychological sense, 
when some activities in consequence of repe-
tition, do not involve consciousness any long-
er; decisions are made beyond the conscious-
ness threshold. The process is essential for eve-
ry training; SS-men training including. 
Now, I should try to answer the question, 
which turned me to the deliberations present-
ed. Where is a threshold of responsibility for 
one’s actions? The problem of responsibility is 
not medical, but rather ethical, legal, philosoph-
ical, nevertheless it is still interesting for a phy-
sician, in spite of the fact that a position of the 
judge is contradictory to the medical profession. 
It is not a task for a physician to assess if a per-
son’s conduct is good or bad, or to what degree 
this person is responsible for his/her doings. 
From the two options: that one is responsible 
only for fully conscious decisions, or that one is 
responsible for all his decisions; the second one 
is closer to the biological approach. The first cov-
ers only small part of life in which decisions are 
made. Full awareness is the condition of respon-
sibility for decision. But, taking into considera-
tion not a moment only, but the whole life of the 
person whose act is being assessed, we are able 
to reach a point in life history, in which the deci-
sion for the assessed act had been born, but dis-
appeared later from consciousness in result of 
repression or automation; in a critical moment 
the act itself was performed impulsively or au-
tomatically, without participation of “free will”; 
nevertheless it does not mean, that the essence of 
the act was never present in the person. Moreo-
ver, it was present stronger than in a conscious 
decision, consciousness being an external part of 
our life, being developed in relation with a new 
situation; and the subconscious decision is an 
expression of what in the life of this person was 
coming back repeatedly, or was placed deeply 
within him or her. It would be a reversion of the 
notion qui dormit, non peccat. Night dream, al-
cohol intoxication, according to proverb in vino 
veritas reveals the true image of the human be-
ing better than his or her life in the awakened 
state, in which decisions often mask his/her es-
sential truth. It is obvious, that in the concentra-
tion camp life, a varnish of everyday, normal life 
was quickly washed off; what remained was the 
naked person. It this sense, the camp was a test 
for human value.
The third variant of the ramp situation re-
ferred to the majority of prisoners, those una-
ware of the fate awaiting them immediately. SS-
men tried to support this unawareness until the 
end. That is why their behaviour was relatively 
civilised. Maybe some of the prisoners had felt 
a strangeness of the situation as well as the ap-
proaching annihilation. The mind opposed such 
intuitive anticipation and suggested concentrat-
ing on the usual business – looking for water, 
food, caring for close ones, belongings, plans for 
the nearest future, etc. This was a territory for 
decisions; they were similar to those being made 
previously, before imprisonment. The nearest fu-
ture known, they would be different. 
This is a situation similar to these lived 
through by everybody in everyday life. The fu-
ture is unknown; nevertheless one is entering it 
with one’s decisions, hoping it will be formed ac-
cording to one’s wishes. Projecting into the fu-
ture is the characteristic of life. For many, once 
the plan of action is chosen; its realisation be-
gins. The choice itself is entering the future and 
determining the way one goes. The ramp situ-
ation reveals deceitfulness of this way; the fate 
can cut it in any point. Our life experience, how-
ever, does not make our tendency to project our-
selves into the future any weaker. This tendency 
characterises life. In depression, with a decrease 
in life dynamics the tendency to project into the 
future becomes weaker too; the future seems to 
be black and decisions extremely difficult. In a 
normal condition, the human being does not 
turn away from the future; even in the most dif-
ficult moments one does not lose the ability to 
decide; this way one conquers future. 
The three variants of the ramp situation present-
ed were selected from many possible ones relat-
ed to the problem of decision; nevertheless, many 
concentration camp situations, being crystal clear, 
make understanding of the problem easier. 
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